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Most self-reports of heroic action in both reactive and social (proactive) cases describe
the experience as involving a kind of necessity. This seems intuitively sound, but it makes
it unclear why heroism is accorded strong approbation. To resolve this, I show that the
necessity involved in heroism is a nonselfsacrificial practical necessity. (1) Approaching
the intentional structure of human action from the perspective of embodiment, focusing
especially on the predispositionality of pre-reflective skill, I develop a phenomenological
interpretation of Bernard Williams’ notion of “practical necessity” as an endogenous
existential necessity. (2) I then offer a view of reactive heroism as instantiating this kind
of necessity by literally embodying certain socially affirmed values in a way that is not
self-sacrificial. This evinces a deep social bond, and it is this bond, rather than the
action itself, that is the ground of approbation. (3) I then discuss how this construal
of reactive heroism can be extended to cases of social heroism by way of a necessity
that is internal to the agent’s individual character. Similarly to reactive cases, a social
hero literally embodies a certain ethical commitment such that her actions are likewise
instances of nonselfsacrificial practical necessity. (4) I then discuss how the commitment
perceived in cases of social heroism pertains to the actualization of “surplus validity,” such
that whereas the reactive hero is praised for embodying shared value, the social hero is
praised for embodying a commitment to actualizing the concrete potential of such value
more fully The approbation accorded to social heroism is therefore tied inextricably to a
normative judgment concerning such immanent progressive transformation.
Keywords: heroism, practical necessity, phenomenology of the body, embodied action, pre-reflective
intentionality, self-sacrifice, habitus

Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders! Gott helfe mir, Amen!
Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise! May God help me, Amen!

These famous words are conventionally attributed to Martin Luther speaking in his own defense
on 18 April 1521 at the Diet of Worms against accusations of heresy. While as a matter of historical
fact it is unlikely that he uttered anything in this exact form1 , it is widely held that this attribution
nonetheless reflects quite accurately the spirit of his oratory that day. Refusing steadfastly to recant
his published views that were highly critical of the papacy and other institutions and doctrines of
the Catholic Church, views that had already led to his excommunication by Pope Leo X, Luther
bravely stuck by his convictions and knowingly risked severe personal consequences. As the Edict
1 These

words themselves were not in the original verbatim transcript, but were added to the record later—see, for example,
(Bainton (1950), p. 185); (Atkinson (1981), p. 161f); (Brecht (1985), pp. 460, 537 note 24); (Wilson (2007), pp. 153, 170).
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Characterizing both reactive and social heroism as involving
some kind of necessity may be entirely appropriate, at least at a
rhetorical level. Yet upon scrutiny it is somewhat puzzling. For
while we may be intuitively inclined to accord considerable praise
and esteem to a hero so described, it is not altogether clear why
we would do so, if we take it as being indeed literally the case that
she was unable to do otherwise and thus arguably not morally
responsible for the specific action or course of actions in question.
To be sure, we might still hold a positive view—as we would,
for example, in a reactive case of someone whose uncontrollable
flatulence happened to incapacitate an active shooter. But our
response would surely differ, in both nature and degree, from
a case in which someone—like James Shaw, to take a recent
example—who achieved the same result through direct physical
intervention that evinced “selfless disregard for his own safety”6 .
Or similarly, while we might hold a positive view of someone
who felt internally compelled to engage wholeheartedly in a
selfless course of risky prosocial action, even if we believed
that her felt compulsion to do so stemmed ultimately from an
exogenous process of political indoctrination, this would again
surely differ in both nature and degree from a case in which
someone conducted herself in the same way, yet of whom we
believed the felt compulsion to do so was in fact a genuinely
internal or endogenous factor. At the same time, however, it
also seems intuitively compelling that the strong approbation
accorded in cases of either reactive or social heroism is directly
tied to the real possibility that the agent in question could have
acted otherwise—more specifically, to the real possibility that
the individual could simply have not engaged in the action or
actions in question and instead remained, like most others, a
bystander. Assuming arguendo the absence of this possibility in
cases of heroic action, it becomes unexpectedly unclear just why
we would hold these individuals in any higher regard than those
who perform equivalent actions but from a physical or otherwise
exogenous kind of necessity.
As with our intuitions concerning most everything that
concerns us, those with regard to heroism are generally fairly
reliable (e.g., when and where to accord heroic approbation),
but they are also potentially subject to serious confusions (e.g.,
concerning the nature and grounds of such approbation). In
particular, most intuitions concerning heroism are informed by
a widely (if implicitly) held but, I think, ultimately incorrect
set of assumptions to the effect that heroic action is a moral
phenomenon—specifically, that it is morally supererogatory (i.e.,
goes above and beyond the call of moral duty)—and that as
such it is to be praised on account of the self-sacrifice it implies
on the part of the individual agent. For moral praise—the kind
of praise one is owed when one does one’s duty, or, more
relevantly here, when one engages in supererogatory action—is

of Worms, issued shortly thereafter by Emperor Charles V,
expressed the expected official outcome, Luther was to be
apprehended, captured, and punished as “a notorious, obstinate
heretic,” all forms of sympathy or support for whom were also
harshly proscribed in no uncertain terms.
As it turned out, however, the Edict’s measures against Luther
went largely unenforced, and he managed to live and to develop
his reformational views for another quarter-century. Be that as
it may, the dramatic words attributed to him on that day in
Worms—“Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise!”—are often taken
as emblematic of the uncompromising fortitude characteristic
of what is nowadays termed “social heroism,” viz., cases of
proactive heroic action that typically unfold over a long period
of time and with a great deal of reflection, and which aim
at preserving or instituting social values (Franco et al., 2011,
p. 100f)2 —as opposed to reactive or “split-second” cases that
involve actions occurring at a particular moment and seemingly
without any reflection at all3 . Unlike typical reactive cases,
social heroism generally excludes immediate threats, physical
and otherwise, to the agent’s well-being, although it does usually
involve significant on-going hardships and long-term risks, up
to and possibly including the risk of death4 . Such differences
notwithstanding, however, in the same way as reactive heroes
often report after the fact that they plunged into their actions
more or less spontaneously, without any of the sort of selfconscious deliberation that would constitute their heroic actions
as truly optional—saying, for example, “I just did what had to
be done,” the self-descriptions offered by social heroes of their
conduct often likewise involve something effectively equivalent
to Luther’s dictum of necessity (as I shall call it), i.e., the “I cannot
do otherwise!”—saying, for example, “I could not stand by and do
nothing”5 .
2 This in no way implies that Luther himself is necessarily to be regarded or
celebrated as a hero. While some Protestant Christians might so regard him
(presumably overlooking, among other things, his virulent anti-Semitism), most
devout Catholics probably do not (although they might regard Thomas More, say,
or Jeanne d’Arc in analogous ways), and many more people might not care at
all one way or the other about any of these religious figures. All of this can thus
be taken as illustrating the social relativity of attributions of heroism, and of the
specific sort of approbation that goes with such attributions. Nevertheless, it is
possible to study the phenomena of heroism scientifically, and the present analysis
is intended as a conceptual clarification that can help to undergird such study.
3 Although I shall use the more conventional expression “social heroism,” the key
contrast with reactive cases is better captured with the term “proactive,” which
would imply as a corollary the difference in durational character. In any case, none
of this should be taken as implying that reactive or ‘split-second’ heroism is not also
social in some important sense (in a similar way that social heroism, like anything
proactive, is at the same time also reactive in a certain sense).
4 Although Luther himself may have been prepared to die for his actions, there is
no essential connection between the sentiment he is taken to have expressed and
the idea or ideal of martyrdom (cf. Kendrick, 2010, pp. 24–49), where Luther’s
words are taken as emblematic of a martyrial conception of heroism). In general,
according to the view that I shall develop below, while heroism excludes any
overriding concern with biological self-preservation, it is inconsistent with any
genuine martyrial aspirations.
5 Philip Zimbardo may have expressed himself hyperbolically in claiming that
“[e]very single person who’s identified as a hero always says, ‘How could I not
do it?”’ (Sommers, 2009, p. 59), but it is a seemingly constant feature of various
kinds of closely studied cases, many examples of which can be found in Berkowitz
(1987), Oliner and Oliner (1988), Colby and Damon (1994), Monroe (1996), and
Paldiel (2000), among others. However, even if, with regard to human action in
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general, first-personal reports have some degree of epistemic privilege, they are not
authoritative and cannot on their own play any explanatory role with regard to
the intentional structure of an agent’s actions. In this paper, I will take putative
heroes’ self-reports of a sort of necessity simply as an invitation to explore whether
something like that could possibly be true, not as evidence that it is true.
6 See Nashville municipal resolution RS2018-1182 https://www.nashville.
gov/Metro-Clerk/Legislative/Resolutions/Details/abe66859-36d1-4908-80faaae1d66950a2/2015-2019/RS2018-1182.aspx
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2. I then offer a view of reactive heroism as instantiating this kind
of necessity by literally embodying certain socially affirmed
universal values in a way that is not self-sacrificial and therefore
not, properly speaking, moral, nor a fortiori supererogatory.
In terms of approbation, then, it follows that when we praise
a reactive hero, we are not so much praising what she does
as what she is, to wit, her predispositional corporeal being as
it is summoned and activated, so to speak, by the particular
situation. In spontaneously crystallizing an important shared
social value in a situation in which most others fail to act, her
heroic action evinces a deep bond with her social world, and it
is this bond, I suggest, rather than the action itself that brings
it to light (although that is not unimportant), that awes us and
elicits approbation. We praise the reactive hero, in other words,
because in realizing herself, she gives powerful expression to
who we are8 .
3. I then discuss how this corporeal construal of reactive heroism
as positively self-realizing rather than self-sacrificial can be
extended to cases of social heroism. Here I show that the
necessity to which Luther’s dictum alludes can be understood
as a constraint internal to the embodied, pre-reflective
intentional structure of the proactivity in question, such that
the idea of doing fundamentally otherwise would thus imply
self-abnegation on the part of the agent far more clearly than
in reactive cases. For while much tactical deliberation may
occur with regard to specific actions, the social hero’s reflection
on her overall goal is not a matter of considering alternative
possibilities, but of self-discovery with regard to the necessity
that is internal to and hence deeply expressive of her individual
identity or character. Similarly to reactive cases, then, a social
hero literally embodies a certain ethical commitment such
that her actions are likewise carried by normatively valenced
vectors of pre-reflective intentionality and are equally instances
of nonselfsacrificial practical necessity9 .
4. Turning to the question of approbation, I discuss how, unlike
reactive cases, which evince the spontaneous affirmation of
an established social value, the commitment perceived in
cases of social heroism has more to do with the actualization
of what I shall call, borrowing a term from Axel Honneth,
“surplus validity,” that is, the fact that the meaning and
scope of a given society’s existing ethical norms can be
altered and expanded. Thus, whereas the reactive hero is
praised for embodying shared value, (rather than for her
action per se or the manner of its performance), the social

premised implicitly on the notion that such action involves the
self-conscious subordination of personal inclination in favor of
an impartial or altruistic moral imperative. It implies, in other
words, that moral action is freely chosen over equally possible but
more self-regarding options, that in this sense moral action—and
supererogatory action especially—is essentially self-sacrificial,
and that it is considered praiseworthy precisely for this reason.
Here, I submit, is the source of the puzzle regarding heroism that
is self-reported by the individual agents themselves as involving
a kind of internal compulsion. For taking them at their word,
if they really could not do otherwise, then there is no sense in
speaking of them as having made a choice on that occasion, let
alone a self-sacrificial choice (cf. Archer, 2015, p. 119)7 . If that is
so, then there would seem to be no grounds for moral praise—
and lacking any alternative conception of approbation, there
would thus seem to be no grounds for any praise at all (although
we certainly may hold a positive view). Their action would be
seen as a natural event that simply happened fortuitously, like a
bolt of lightning (or flatulence) that fells an active shooter.
Now, for the sake of the present argument I shall assume
that heroism in general—at least pending certain conceptual
clarifications—does in fact instantiate a certain form of necessity,
and in particular that Luther’s dictum of necessity does indeed
apply to social heroism. But I want to show that this is not
at all inconsistent with the relatively high degree of positive
approbation that is normally accorded to it. To show the
possibility of maintaining both of these intuitions in the face of
the puzzling situation sketched out above, I propose to rethink
the sense of necessity that heroism involves, especially cases of
social heroism, in order to clarify the underlying nature of heroic
action and on this basis to suggest a new understanding of the
normative grounds of heroic approbation in general.
The analysis will be developed across four main steps:
1. Approaching the intentional structure of human action from
the perspective of embodiment, focusing especially on the
predispositionality of pre-reflective skill, I first develop a
phenomenological interpretation of Bernard Williams’ notion
of “practical necessity” as an endogenous existential necessity
or incapacity to do otherwise, and consider this in connection
with ethical action in particular.
7I

have discussed the nonselfsacrificial nature of heroism more fully in Smyth
(2018) in the context of drawing out the contrast within the category of (what I’ll
call) “extraordinary prosocial action” between heroic and supererogatory action,
in which the latter is, while the former is not, a matter of self-sacrifice. The key
point is that supererogatory (or “saintly”) action is strictly speaking moral action
in that it issues ultimately from processes of reflective moral deliberation, with the
implication that the agent could do otherwise, while “heroic” action is not moral
in this sense, in that it issues predominantly from embodied habituality, and as
such involves the sort of predispositional necessity discussed here. This is a crucial
distinction, but one that is typically glossed over. This distinction is central to my
overall approach, but in the present paper I do not discuss “saintly” action directly.
In what follows, then, it should be borne in mind that I am considering heroism
to be a sub-category of extraordinary prosocial action, and that as such I am not
claiming that all such actions are heroic in the sense that I shall ascribe to this term
(i.e., the other sub-category of supererogatory action remains). As I note below, this
may entail upsetting some existing intuitions, but the hope is that on the whole the
resulting view will be able to avoid many of the ambiguities and equivocations that
still affect contemporary thinking about heroism.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

8 Critical

attention must always be paid to the casual way in which first-person
plural pronouns are used in philosophy and the human sciences. Here, “we” merely
denotes some particular community as a reflection of the fact that attributions of
heroism are not universal—it is well known that what is lauded as heroism by one
community may be vilified by another—and that they hinge upon a multitude of
cultural, historical, and political variables. But as noted above, the phenomena of
heroism can still be the object of scientific study.
9 The expression “pre-reflective intentionality” denotes those aspects of one’s
intentional relatedness to the world that fall below the level of explicit selfconscious awareness. It includes the kind of intentionality that is involved in, for
example, basic activities like movement or grasping, forms of habitual skill, the
ways in which one responds to and orients oneself in a situation, one’s lived sense
of space and time, and the ways in which one tacitly carries elements of the past
while projecting horizons of anticipation.
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matter of sheer automaticity, but rather of increasingly strong
predispositions that are always subject to and coordinated with
other situational factors.
These predispositions are thus not as simple or
straightforward as they may at first seem. To begin, they
are situationally transposable—a racquetball player is not an
absolute beginner in her first squash match, a clarinetist shifts to
the oboe more easily than a cellist. And this transposability could
be much less plain to see—running a daycare for special needs
children might equip one with skills well-suited to chairing an
academic department. One can thus do something for the very
first time yet still be habitually predisposed to it. In other words,
what I am calling habitual predispositions can, in terms of their
underlying intentionality, be quite general with regard to the
situations in which they operate—they need not manifest as an
overtly regular pattern of behavior, nor arise from such a pattern.
And they can also operate negatively and unselfconsciously,
as when, for example, someone phobicly avoids crowded or
constrained spaces due to a repressed traumatic experience. In
all these cases, what we are pointing to in the habitual level of
embodied existence are pre-reflective intentionalities that are
situationally-responsive, and which operate predispositionally
as the anonymous background conditions that give personal
existence its idiosyncratic profile.
But the operation of these habitualities is not to be
observed solely in terms of idiosyncrasies. For it can be
seen no less clearly in terms of the mannerisms, postural
schemata, modes of comportment, and speech patterns, for
example—what Marcel Mauss (1936) called “body techniques”—
that more broadly form culturally common corporeal “styles”
or “idioms” (Goffman, 1971; Elias, 2000[1939]). Even when
considered (as I am doing here) in prediscursive embodied terms,
perceptual and motor idiosyncrasies develop in specific social,
cultural, and historical contexts. The habitual level of embodied
existence thus internalizes—or incorporates—and hence comes
quite literally to incarnate certain aspects of the individual’s
intersubjective and social milieux. This does not mean that
everyone is alike—within a given socio-cultural context there are
typically differences, for example, pertaining—sometimes quite
problematically—to perceived phenotypical characteristics. In a
dynamically aggregated or intercorporeal sense, then, habitual
embodiment is thus the primary and central locus of what
Pierre Bourdieu (in particular) termed “habitus,” pithily glossing
this as the “durably installed generative principle of regulated
improvisation” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78), under the dispositional
auspices of which individual perception and behavior unfold.
This model of embodied existence as involving an actual
level that in general does not coincide with a socially embedded
habitual level suggests conceiving selfhood as a function of
the ongoing tension between the two levels—a tension which
can but certainly need not be experienced negatively, and it
suggests conceiving self-realization as the process of negotiating
this tension and striving to bring about an optimal or at least
minimally disharmonious integration of the two dimensions.
Logically, this can be pursued in two broad ways, either of which
could represent a path to authenticity (if we wish to speak that
way): one can reflectively cast one’s intentions forward with the

hero is analogously praised for embodying a commitment
to actualizing or instituting the concrete potential of such
value more fully. The approbation accorded to her is therefore
tied inextricably to one’s normative judgment concerning this
immanent progressive transformation. If we praise a social
hero, then, it is because in and through realizing herself, she
gives concrete expression, not so much to who we are, as with
reactive heroism, but to who we are aspiring to be10 .

EMBODIED ACTION AND PRACTICAL
NECESSITY
As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Smyth, 2010, 2014),
the reasoning here draws its initial inspiration from Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment (MerleauPonty, 1945). In particular, it draws on the claim that
while mind–body dualism (Cartesian or otherwise) is certainly
false, concretely understood our embodied existence does
involve a certain temporal duality that we may express using
the spatial metaphor of levels: there is a “habitual” level
(linked to the past), and an “actual” level (tied to the
present). Each of these levels is orthogonal to the distinction
that can be drawn analytically between mind and body.
Generally speaking, the actual level pertains to personal
existence or “ipseity” in the sense of occurrent bodily and
reflective intentional states, in relation to which the habitual
level forms the impersonal or pre-personal background. The
latter is the anonymous accretion of internalized—or, to
use a suggestive phenomenological metaphor, sedimented—
experiences that develops dynamically across time and which,
in establishing certain pre-reflectively intentional habitualities,
transforms the psychosomatically integral organism in enduring
and intrinsic ways, and provides the enabling and constraining
conditions for personal existence at the actual level.
We might initially think of this in terms of the sedimentation
of perceptual and motor experiences, and take the development
through repeated practice of specific skills that emphasize such
experiences and their coordination—for example, learning to
ride a bicycle or to swim, to play racquetball or the clarinet—
as paradigmatic of the sort of habitualities involved. But
setting habitual compulsive disorders aside, we must bear in
mind that even with the most routine of habits, the contexts
in which they are repeatedly enacted are never exactly the
same—indeed, it is characteristic of highly developed skills,
or skillful “expertise,” to be sensitive to situational differences
and thus correspondingly flexible or improvisational (Dreyfus
and Dreyfus, 1980; Dreyfus, 2004). Even the actualization
of perceptual and motor habitualities, then, is never a
10 It

is worth noting here that although the reconceptualization of heroism that I
develop below may upset some of our existing intuitions, its goal is to uphold the
most important ones by gaining a firmer handle on the relevant phenomena, so
as to be able to solve the puzzle concerning the strong approbation that heroism
typically elicits. It is also worth emphasizing that this rethinking of heroism unfolds
in a conceptual space that temporarily places in abeyance any empirical research
concerning heroism that has been conducted on different conceptual bases. Such
research can speak neither for nor against what I’m doing, because at least for the
time being the meaning of heroism is precisely in question.
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or “ethical expertise” that guides us through our “everyday
ongoing ethical coping” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1991, 2004) in
ways that are strongly analogous to how other forms of acquired
skillful expertise, like bicycle riding or clarinet playing, likewise
guide us through everyday coping in their relevant contexts.
Comprising “the interrelated, and possibly conflicting, values,
virtues, goods, rights, behaviors, attitudes, etc. which make up
the ethical fabric” of one’s social context (DeSouza, 2013, p. 284),
such pre-reflective familiarity with the contours of that context’s
normative landscape or ethical habitus involves a tacit perceptual
sensitivity to the axiological import (e.g., the recognition of
the intrinsic value of humanity) that gives rise to situations of
ethical significance in the first place. As a kind of “ethical second
nature” that we come to embody (literally) through socialization
and interpersonal experience, it guides most of our quotidian
interactions with others, while also providing the motivational
and evaluative background for any more explicitly formulated
moral intentions.
What is especially important to note here is that as with
the skills involved in bicycle riding or clarinet playing, “expert
ethical comportment” is profoundly spontaneous in that as a kind
of pre-reflective know-how, it involves no explicit deliberation.
Consider the following phenomenological observations made
several decades ago by Maurice Mandelbaum concerning actions
that are spontaneous yet have a situationally-sensitive ethical
import:

aim of modifying the habitus—that is, of pushing the envelope
of “regulated improvisation”—by engaging in actions directly
toward which one does not currently have strong predispositions;
or else one can refrain from any such reflective projection and
fall back on the pre-reflective intentionalities residing already
in the habitus. One can, so to speak, resolve to break out of
a perceived rut, or else go with the flow. In either case, the
options are wide. But looked at in this “existential” way that
excludes any purely biological reality, it is worth noting that
optimal self-realization need not place any overriding priority
on biological self-preservation—one can try to break out of a
rut by trekking solo across the Sahara, for example, or taking up
alligator wrestling, while one could go with the flow by jumping
on the fentanyl bandwagon, or by heeding a patriotic recruitment
campaign and enlisting for armed conflict. Needless to say,
existential ruts and flows are highly situationally contingent.
Actions pertaining to the ethical life of society exemplify selfrealization along these lines with particular clarity. For in general,
at any given moment, there is usually a discrepancy between
our actual personal inclinations and the morally praiseworthy
actions that are normatively expected of us—indeed, as noted
earlier, such actions are morally praiseworthy primarily because
of the altruism that they demand. But it is situationally contingent
as to which dimension (if either) of our embodied being is the
more other-regarding. For example, one might live in a social
context in which it is considered normal and acceptable to walk
past a hungry homeless person with indifference—in such a case,
falling back on the habitus, going with the flow, would seem to be
the ethically deficient path, and that a morally superior response
would require an overridingly deliberate, reflective effort to offer
alms, food, or other assistance. Conversely, one might live in
a society in which such a manner of response was itself a
predispositional feature of the habitus, that is, of one’s habitual
embodiment, such that even if on some particular occasion
one happened to be very hungry oneself or otherwise selfconcerned, the habitual disposition might still hold sway11 . In
short, inasmuch as we do actually fulfill our ethical expectations,
in some cases the intentional structure of our action stems from
a process of reflective moral deliberation, while in other cases
any such reflection is eschewed and we act simply on the basis
of habitual pre-reflective intentionalities. Sometimes we choose
to do good, sometimes we just do it.
The former scenario may be more familiar when thinking
about ethical issues, and it may garner more scholarly attention.
Yet it is arguably more exceptional than typical. To be sure,
situations that prompt reflective moral deliberation do arise, but
on the whole it seems that more of what goes on in human
coexistence corresponds to the latter scenario, in which one
falls back upon what we might call one’s “pre-reflective ethical
know-how” (DeSouza, 2013), the specific kind of “skillful coping”

I sense the embarrassment of a person, and turn the conversation
aside; I see a child in danger and catch hold of its hand; I hear a
crash and become alert to help. Actions such as these (of which
our daily lives are in no small measure composed) do not, at the
time, seem to spring from the self: in such cases I am reacting
directly and spontaneously to what confronts me. [. . . ] In such
cases it is appropriate to speak of ‘reactions’ and ‘responses’, for in
them no sense of initiative or feeling of responsibility is present
(1955, p. 48).

As Mandelbaum went on to observe in a striking fashion, from
the perspective of such actions themselves, “we can only say that
we acted as we did because the situation extorted that action
from us” (Mandelbaum, 1955, p. 49, italics added). From the
first-person perspective of the agent, in other words, there is no
experience of choice but rather of a situational necessity that
elicits a certain response from oneself12 .
This view of necessity offers a compelling phenomenological
interpretation of what Bernard Williams had in mind with the
notion of “moral incapacity”—“the kind of incapacity that is in
question when we say of someone, usually in commendation
of him, that he could not act or was not capable of acting in
certain ways” (Williams, 1993, p. 59)—and how this leads to
12 Cf. Merleau-Ponty: “The body is but one element in the system of the subject and
his world, and the task elicits from him the necessary movements through a sort
of attraction at a distance, just as the phenomenal forces at work in my visual field
elicit from me, without any calculation, the motor reactions that will establish the
optimum equilibrium between them, or as the customs of our social setting or the
arrangement of our listeners immediately elicits from us the appropriate words,
attitudes, and tone” (1945, p. 123f). Various echoes of this general perspective can
also be found in Varela (1999), Wright (2007), Rietveld (2013), among others.

11 For

the purposes of this conceptual analysis, these sort of homespun thought
experiments can be sufficient. To carry the discussion further, however, would of
course require corroboration from credible empirical research. But it is crucial to
bear in mind that all empirical research is conducted within certain conceptual
and theoretical frameworks, and that if one wishes, as I do, to offer an alternative
framework, then special care must be taken when trying to assimilate the results of
existing research.
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then, in such situations agents make a virtue out of necessity—
and in ethical situations, this sense is doubly literal, with virtue
and necessity going hand in hand.

a “practical necessity” (Williams, 1981), in cases where one is
thusly incapable of performing any action but one, typically in
the form of being incapable of not performing that one, however
the modal situation may appear to third-person observers. For
his part, Williams viewed this situation in terms of character,
noting, for example, that such incapacities and necessities can
be constitutive of one’s character, and that “to be an expression
of character is perhaps the most substantial way in which an
action can be one’s own” (1981, p. 130). As Kyle Fruh expressed
it more recently, “[t]he issuances of practical necessity are to be
seen not as constraints imposed on an agent, but as expressions
of the core characteristics of the agent” (2017, p. 32). My
own aim here is to show that character in this regard is best
understood phenomenologically in the pre-reflective terms of
habitual embodied action. Agentive incapacities, no less than
capacities, are grounded here, and it is in this way, specifically in
terms of corporeal sedimentation of the ethical habitus, that we
can make best sense of how ethical principles can be “internalized
and appropriated as part of one’s identity” (Schlenker et al.,
2009, p. 319), such that the individual is spontaneously able
to enact them appropriately, and to do so in an endogenously
necessary way that is fully self-realizing—as Colby and Damon
said of the moral exemplars they studied, “[n]one saw their
moral choices as an exercise in self-sacrifice” (Colby and Damon,
1994, p. 300, italics removed)13 . It is in terms of the two-level
phenomenological model of embodiment, in other words, that we
can best make sense of how an ethical imperative could manifest
as a nonselfsacrificial practical necessity.
The key point here is that the strength of this necessity
correlates—somewhat counterintuitively—with the degree of
“ethical expertise,” that is, with the degree to which one’s ethical
actions are unreflectively spontaneous—as with bicycles and
clarinets, higher degrees of ethical virtuosity go hand in hand
with lower degrees of reflective deliberation. In such situations,
“[o]ne feels that one’s comportment was caused by the perceived
conditions [. . . ] We do not experience our intentions as causing
our bodily movements; rather, in skillful coping we experience
the situation as drawing the movements out of us” (Dreyfus,
2002, p. 379f). Now, to describe ethical action as being in any
way caused from without is potentially misleading. For the
idea is just that the actions in question are matters of prereflective intentionality which, rooted deeply in our corporeality,
is something (not unlike muscular tonus, say) that we do not
normally experience in subjective terms. So while we may say
that the situation elicits or draws the action out of an agent,
it is nonetheless her response to it. The point is that there is
such a close and intimate attunement to the situation, such a
profoundly immersive oneness between it and the agent’s habitual
embodiment, that like a steeply banked turn at the velodrome or
a complex musical phrase in the orchestra pit, there is really only
one possible action to take—and there is no sense at all that the
necessity of this action is external to the agent or that it in any way
threatens or compromises her agency. In a very concrete sense,

REACTIVE HEROISM AS EMBODIED
PHENOMENON
Having laid all that out, I will now turn to reactive heroism
and relate it to this framework. In doing so, I shall take as a
possible example the case of Tom Lee (1885–1952), an unskilled
African-American laborer who, although unable to swim, used
his small boat to pull 32 people from the Mississippi river
when the sternwheeler M.E. Norman overturned near Memphis
on May 8, 1925. Although his actions received extraordinary
commendation from the public and from government officials,
Lee himself expressed the sentiment of personal disavowal that is
characteristic of heroic action in analogous cases: “I guess I didn’t
do any more than anyone else would have done in my place”
(Finger, 2014)14 .
I submit that cases of reactive heroism like this are matters
of embodied habitual action. On the face of it, it may seem
highly implausible to claim that an action like that of Tom
Lee on that day in 1925 is “habitual,” since he had never
done anything quite like it prior to that occasion, and never
did anything quite like it again. There is absolutely nothing
routine about the actions in question. But a key point from the
phenomenological discussion above (section Embodied Action
and Practical Necessity) is that the nature of habitual action
does not lie essentially in manifest patterns, but rather in
the prior corporeal internalization of certain perceptual and
motor skills as pre-reflective intentionalities which then, in the
form of predispositional schemata, enable individuals to act
in a spontaneously “expert” way in an indefinite number of
different situations15 . So it is immaterial that most heroic actions,
including Lee’s, appear to be unique one-off occurrences. With
regard to Lee, the idea would be that he had internalized certain
universal features of the ethical habitus of his society, such as
the impartial recognition of the intrinsic value of humanity;
that these features had “sedimented” in the habitual dimension
of his embodied existence such as to equip him with the prereflective ethical know-how that predisposed him to do what
he did on that day, and to do so under the kind of practical
necessity that accompanies spontaneous “expert” behavior in
general16 . Indeed, in cases like this, where someone acts in an
14 In taking Lee as a possible example of my view of reactive heroism, what I wish to
do is simply take the manifest bio-historical facts of the case—people were caught
in the river, Lee was in the vicinity, and he responded in a seemingly spontaneous
and selfless way—and see if an interpretation of it in terms of embodied habitual
action can plausibly fit those facts. The example itself is not being called upon to
do any theoretical work, and I am not taking his statement—which at any rate is
vague and uninformative with regard to the intentional structure of his actions—as
in any way authoritative.
15 This may be seen as a phenomenological specification of the idea of “special
training” as discussed by Kohen et al. (2017, p. 10f).
16 To reiterate, this is a possible interpretation of the Lee case, any account of which
would be equally interpretive, inasmuch as the relevant details concerning Lee’s
intentional state at the time are empirically inaccessible, as they typically are even
in contemporary cases. Competing interpretations would have to be adjudicated

13 To

reiterate an earlier point, there is nothing authoritative about such selfreports, mediated or otherwise. But they can play an instructively illuminating role,
and it is in that sense alone that they are being invoked here.
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is nothing intrinsically estimable about going with the flow and
acting on the basis of habitual predispositions—no doubt some
of the white Americans that Lee saved were especially prone to
engage in objectionably racist behavior (by our lights) whenever
they fell back on their habitual predispositions. What is so highly
commendable about reactive heroism is the fact that the hero is
someone who is ontologically predisposed to do good, a fact that
is brought to light by the unusual nature of the heroic action, but
which is not identical with it nor reducible to it. What awes us
about the reactive hero, then, is the recognition that on account
of having internalized features of the shared habitus, she gives
extraordinary expression to an ordinariness we share, and which
is partly constitutive of our sociality—our approbation celebrates
an existential or even intercorporeal continuity with the hero that
is structurally absent from cases of moral supererogation20 .

ethically extraordinary yet clearly spontaneous way, how else
could we make sense of it? If we do not interpret the action as
the practically necessary actualization of habitual predispositions,
then we would have no choice but to dismiss it as a fortuitous
fluke to which no particularly strong approbation would be due.
To be sure, talk of “ethical expertise” can seem odd, and it
is potentially misleading if it suggests a high level of cognitive
engagement. As discussed above, though, the point is exactly the
opposite—in the sense in which it is being used here, “expertise”
describes a degree of skill development at which, even while
remaining situationally responsive, the need for explicit reflective
deliberation is precisely obviated. As Colby and Damon said
of the moral exemplars they studied, “we saw no ‘eking out’
of moral acts through intricate, tortuous cognitive processing.
Instead, we saw an unhesitating will to act, a disavowal of fear and
doubt, and a simplicity of moral response” (Colby and Damon,
1994, p. 70)17 . And this may apply well to cases like that of
Tom Lee. More generally, reactive heroism is characterized by
the eschewal of moral reflection in favor, so to speak, of “going
with the flow”—understood here as falling back into a state
of unselfconscious immersion in one’s habitual predispositions,
something that may well be a necessary condition of the “optimal
psychological functioning” often referred to precisely as “flow”
(cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 218; Annas, 2008). In this context
of expert ethical spontaneity, the reactive hero does not choose
to do the right thing, but just does it as a matter of the practical
necessity established by her own characteristic predispositions
in the particular circumstances of the situation18 . So while it
may appear that reactive heroism involves prosocial self-sacrifice
on the part of the agent, I submit that a more coherent and
compelling understanding would view the action in question as
subjectively incarnating and identifying with universal features
of the ethical habitus, and as being a nonselfsacrificial matter of
authentic self-realization for this reason19 .
It is therefore the fact that the reactive hero is someone who
does not need to deliberate—that in her very being ipseity and
habituality momentarily coincide—that grounds the approbation
that we accord. It is not the action per se, since after all this is done
on the basis of a practical necessity—it is rather the fact of its
being endogenously necessary that truly awes us. Likewise, there

SOCIAL HEROISM AND PRACTICAL
NECESSITY
I shall now turn to consider whether the above account of
reactive heroism as a phenomenon of embodied action that
instantiates nonselfsacrificial practical necessity can be extended
to cases of social heroism21 . A key difference here is that reactive
heroism, owing to how its spontaneity precludes reflection, does
not admit of a contrasting scenario in which the intentional
structure of an outwardly equivalent action would involve
reflective deliberation rather than habitual predisposition. With
social heroism, however, there is such a contrast with scenarios
of moral supererogation in which outwardly equivalent actions
are performed electively in preference to at least one less altruistic
alternative—i.e., cases in which there is no necessity (practical or
otherwise) involved, hence “I could do otherwise!”—and which
as such are self-sacrificial22 . There is nothing wrong with this, of
course, and it generally merits high moral praise. But it differs
fundamentally from social heroism, even if on the face of it the
actions in question are indistinguishable, inasmuch as the social
hero, like her reactive counterpart, literally embodies the relevant
social value, whereas the supererogatory action is reflectively
mediated.
Here I shall take as a possible example the case of Virginia
Foster Durr (1903–1999), who, despite being born into a life of
Southern white privilege, devoted most of her adult life to the
struggle for equal civil rights in the United States, in particular
with regard to effecting desegregation and outlawing the poll tax
in the South (see Colby and Damon, 1994, pp. 92–133; Durr,
2003). Concerning her activism, Durr expressed views that are
fairly typical of social heroism. With regard to abolishing the

on the basis of their relative plausibility, for example, and their coherence with
other commitments.
17 See note 13 above.
18 While some connections may be drawn with discussions of automaticity
(cf. Snow, 2010; Lapsley and Narvaez, 2014; Rees and Webber, 2014), I
would caution against applying that notion to cases of heroism, lest we
confound existing intuitions concerning approbation. The main salience of
disclosing phenomenologically the habitual level is to locate a meaningful ground
intermediate to reflective deliberation and automaticity on which to base an
understanding that captures both the ethical content of heroic action and its
spontaneity, and that can therefore do justice to our intuitions concerning both
of these features of heroism, even if it upsets others.
19 There are some clear similarities between this view and the main tenets of
virtue ethics, which is similarly concerned with dispositional character rather than
reflectively intentional actions as such. But I would caution that such affinities
could easily be overstated, at least inasmuch as virtue ethics typically retains
a morally other-regarding focus that still valorizes self-sacrifice in a vestigial
way, whereas heroism implies a more expressly positive account of agential
self-realization (cf. Franco et al., 2016).
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20 Strictly speaking, if supererogation implies reflection, then there cannot be cases
of spontaneous supererogation. In part this reflects confused intuitions concerning
reactive heroism, but there may be cases falling between reactive and social
heroism—see next note.
21 Clearly this distinction is somewhat simplistic in that there may be cases falling
between the spontaneity of reactive heroism and the protractedness of social
heroism, and which might not exhibit practical necessity. But for present purposes
I shall leave this possibility aside.
22 This is what in a previous work (Smyth, 2018) I refer to as “saints”—see note 7
above.
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“personological” views that emphasize the role of character in
bridging this gap. My own point is that we just need to push this
line of reasoning farther: if the spirit is willing, so to speak, but the
flesh is weak, then it stands to reason that we should direct our
attention to our flesh, to our corporeality, and to how it serves as
the site of mediation between judgment and action.
In the same way as a reactive hero, in perceiving a situation
in a certain way, manifests an embodied incapacity to be a
disengaged bystander, that is, acts under an endogenous form
of nonselfsacrificial practical necessity, so too the social hero, in
perceiving a state of affairs in a certain way, can be understood
as manifesting a similar incapacity with an analogous necessity.
It differs, though, in that in this case the necessity is not that
of a spontaneous and unreflective “expert” response, but of an
increasingly recognized visceral refusal to do otherwise. It is in
this sense that social heroism may be said to involve personal
growth and a process of reflective self-discovery. While after
the fact the reactive hero may certainly learn something about
herself and grow personally as a result, this dynamic is internal
to the protracted experience of the social hero, where it can
even involve developmental change at the habitual level—this
is certainly true in the case of someone like Durr. It is thus
central to the reaffirmation of the social hero’s motivation that
she must make as events unfold. To be clear, though, within the
intentional structure of her proactive project, this reflection is
not a matter of deliberating among logically possible alternatives,
but rather of discovering that, for her, there really is no
acceptable alternative. Much more clearly than in reactive cases,
then, doing fundamentally otherwise here would be existentially
self-abnegating on the part of the agent. Although the social
hero still goes with the flow in the sense that her actions
are ultimately carried by normatively valenced vectors of prereflective intentionality in essentially the same way as in reactive
cases, this typically occurs with a much higher level of selfawareness and personal investment.
The reason why the judgment–action gap applies to most of
us is that while we may approve and endorse the actions of a
social hero through our considered ethical judgments, it typically
appears to us that in order to act on those judgments, what
would be required of us would be an act of supererogation—
hence a self-sacrificial act—and we consequently experience a
debilitating hesitation and unwillingness. This is why most of
us fail to act (and why we misperceive heroes as engaging in
supererogatory action), at least on those judgments that exceed
the moral baseline (i.e., the minimum threshold that is expected
of us in a given social context, which most of us have internalized
more or less successfully). Now, some do manage to rise above the
tension and bridge the gap by engaging in supererogatory action.
But in the conceptual scheme that I am trying to work out here, I
want to identify such cases as categorically distinct from heroism
(see Smyth, 2018). For it makes a world of difference whether
the intentional roots of an ethical action are reflective or prereflective—whether it is enacted negatively through a reflective
decision to engage in personal self-sacrifice for moral reasons,
or positively as a matter of self-realization that coincides with
an internalized universality. The reason why most of us might
approve of a social hero’s actions yet be unable to follow suit is

poll tax, for example, “I thought the right to vote was something
that everybody ought to have,” and she considered this to be an
established norm that was just not yet fully instituted. “Although
I seemed radical to other people, and was considered radical, I
never thought of myself as being radical because I was simply
doing what was common everywhere else.” With regard to racial
desegregation, she claimed that “there were no choices to make.”
There were, of course, choices to make, but these did not bear
upon the basic project, which was shot through with a kind of
necessity: “as far as the decisions I made concerning my part
[. . . ] in the racial struggle in the South, it wasn’t a decision, it
was something that grew over a period of years and one thing
led to another.” In short: “I did what I felt I had to do” (Colby
and Damon, 1994: 133, pp. 121, 71, 120, 124). My aim here is to
sketch out how Luther’s dictum of necessity could apply to cases
like this23 .
As discussed above (section Embodied Action and Practical
Necessity), the idea of practical necessity drawn from Williams
helps to make initial sense of the necessity that people like
Durr report in their experience, by articulating how it may
be conceived in terms of ethical constraints and incapacities
rooted internally within the agent’s character. For this is how the
experience of necessity can be rendered consistent with their no
less robust experience of free agency. But what we also saw is that
character in this sense is best and most concretely understood in
phenomenological terms, that is, in terms of the pre-reflective
intentionalities that make up the habitual predispositionality of
our embodied existence. For this affords the most compelling
model of how values, principles, and any other elements of
the ethical habitus can be internalized so as to become stable
and irreducible features of an individual’s character—how, in
other words, the “integration of agency and communion” that
is characteristic of moral exemplars is actually achieved (cf.
Frimer et al., 2011). In cases of reactive heroism this allows us to
understand how dramatic instances of seemingly self-sacrificial
ethical behavior can occur in a completely spontaneous way. In
cases of social heroism, conversely, it will allow us to understand
the perseverance, the recurrently reaffirmed motivation, and the
longitudinal continuity that characterize the agent’s endeavors
over time. In both sorts of cases, though, the basic point is that
it is literally true and not merely a suggestive piece of rhetoric to
say that heroism is the embodiment of ethical commitment.
This is perhaps best approached by way of the well-known
problem of the “judgment–action gap” (Straughan, 1986), viz.,
the fact that at a cognitive level the vast majority of people
tend to affirm various ethical judgments that they consistently
fail to act on. This is something that is shown with particular
(if simplified) clarity whenever a bystander applauds a social
hero—she approves, so why did she remain a bystander? This
problem has motivated much recent work that tries to steer
away from an exclusive focus on cognitive factors toward more
23 As

with Tom Lee above, I am not claiming that the case of Durr, and her selfreports in particular, provides any direct evidence for my claims. Rather, I just
want to hang my interpretation on the bio-historical facts of the case as a way to
illustrate its plausibility—neither example is being called upon to do any theoretical
or conceptual work.
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according to their intrinsic sense. To give a name to this, I
shall borrow the term “surplus validity” from Axel Honneth’s
theory of social recognition (Honneth, 2003, p. 186). This refers
to the fact that, within a given social context, the meaning and
scope of existing ethical norms can, through social and cultural
struggle, be altered and expanded. This is the normative space
that makes an “immanent critique” of society possible, that is, a
critique of society that bases itself normatively not upon some
arbitrary or ideal criteria pulled out of thin air, but upon the
very norms of the society itself. The point of such a critique is
precisely to show that these norms are not fully actualized, that
this entails some form of injustice, and to point toward the kind
of social progress that might make good on the shortcoming.
So even though there is common ground—evinced by the
shared value that reactive heroism embodies—different views of
the meaning and scope of these norms are often contested—
hence the possibility of disapproval or opposition to social
heroism.
As I have described it here, social heroism as an embodied
phenomenon is located entirely within the normative space
of surplus validity. It has nothing to do with idealism in the
loose pie-in-the-sky sense of ungrounded moral aspirations.
There may be a place for that—in social contexts in which the
ethical habitus is very rudimentary or thoroughly compromised
with evil, for example, there may be no possibility of a viable
immanent critique. And hence no heroism. For just as surplus
validity is what makes immanent critique possible, by the same
token it is the basis upon which there could possibly be an embodied
commitment to a socially transformative goal26 . Reactive heroism
is not socially transformative. More generally, a society maintains
itself when individuals act morally, i.e., when they do their
ethical duty. But it does not progress. There’s nothing wrong
with acting morally, of course, and in wanting others to do
likewise—the inherent self-sacrifice is minimal, and the benefits
usually outweigh it. But if we are concerned with progressive
social transformation, morality comes up disappointingly short.
For all it can offer is a view of supererogation in which
self-sacrifice is ratcheted up considerably, with the result that
the judgment–action gap opens up much more widely. That
supererogatory actions are often generally praised is evidence of
broad commitment to values that transcend the minimum moral
baseline of society, but the judgment–action gap is a formidable
obstacle to progress pursued in this way.
If we are concerned with social progress, and if we reject as
unrealistic any extraneous normativity, then our focus should
be on realizing surplus validity. And in terms of action there
would seem to be two broad ways to approach that—moral
supererogation and social heroism—which reflect the two-level
model of embodied existence with which we began. The point
I wish to make here is simply that the approach of social
heroism affords grounds for greater optimism with regard
to the prospects of realizing surplus validity. For in contrast
to moral supererogation, it indicates a way of bridging the
judgment–action gap that it is much more plausible to believe

simply because they have something we lack—which, for the sake
of that simplicity, I will just call a “heroic body.” It is important
to bear in mind that this refers to the way in which bodily
existence incorporates psychosocial aspects of moral culture so as
to thereby become the locus of a hybrid kind of “biopsychosocial
resilience,” rather than just a natural matter of biology24 . There
is much that might be said about this (see especially Efthimiou,
2017). But for present purposes the point I wish to make
is just that as with reactive cases, what is impressive and
commendable about social heroism is that it makes a virtue out
of an endogenous necessity, and that the locus of this necessity is
habitual corporeality. Social heroism emerges from an existential
“must” at the habitual level of embodiment, rather than a moral
“ought” at the actual level, and so it is precisely on account of
having a heroic body—a body that “stands” a certain way (as in
“Here I stand”)—that Luther’s dictum applies to cases of social
heroism.
But this does not yet fully clarify the question concerning
approbation, to which I now turn.

SOCIAL HEROISM AND SOCIAL
PROGRESS
Heroism in general is a matter of actualizing “sedimented”
ethical universality under an endogenous practical necessity,
hence in a nonselfsacrificial way. But there is a further distinction
between reactive and social cases that should be noted here.
Whereas reactive cases enact norms that are already recognized
and affirmed in an effectively universal way within a given
social context (e.g., innocent lives should be saved), but do so
spontaneously in situations (e.g., dangerous ones) in which the
judgment–action gap is especially acute, cases of social heroism
typically have to do with establishing or instituting new ethical
norms (e.g., civil rights should be equal for all). I have argued that,
in both sorts of cases, the relevant heroic actions are ultimately
carried by vectors of embodied pre-reflective intentionality, i.e.,
going with the flow, rather than reflective decisions. Yet social
heroism can, and often does, cut against the grain of society—it
can (and often does) encounter disapproval or opposition in ways
that reactive heroism seldom does. This may seem puzzling—
how can such disapproval or opposition occur when one is
going with the flow of the sedimented ethical habitus? Assuming
arguendo a unified habitus25 , if one is just reflecting social norms
back after having internalized them, then how could there be any
such tension?
To answer this question we must clarify that social heroism
does not involve instituting ethical norms that are utterly novel.
As with Virginia Durr, it is rather a matter of recognizing and
trying to redress the fact that certain socially existing norms –
e.g., individual civil rights, or the right to vote—while valid and
valuable in themselves, are not instituted correctly or completely
24 It is not just a matter of moral culture, but other acquired

skills and habitualities
too. Cf. (Kohen et al. (2017), p. 2): “The real reason that most people are bystanders
rather than heroes is that most people are out of practice.”
25 This assumption may be false, but if so, then the problem can be solved much
more easily.
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could be cultivated on a broad scale. For if within a given ethical
habitus there are indeed latent but nonetheless real tendencies
that would exceed the moral baseline of the status quo, then it
seems entirely reasonable to suppose that they could be realized
or instituted concretely much more effectively to the extent
that individuals’ commitment to them was a positive matter
of their self-realization through existential identification, even
to the point of becoming a practical necessity, rather than
as a moral aspiration to be achieved through self-sacrificial
supererogation27 .
In sum, regardless of how we may construe it intuitively, our
approbation of social heroism is an expression of our normative
judgment concerning this kind of immanent social progress, and

of our recognition that the hero’s self-realization is bound to the
historical transformation it implies. Whereas the reactive hero is
praised relatively uncontroversially for embodying shared value,
the social hero is praised, more contentiously, for embodying a
commitment to actualizing the concrete potential of such value
more fully. If we do in fact praise a social hero, then, it is because
we sense that in and through realizing herself, she gives powerful
concrete expression, not so much to who we are, as with reactive
heroism, nor to who we might ideally aspire to be, as with moral
supererogation, but to who we are in fact aspiring to be28 .
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this raises myriad questions concerning how it could actually be
brought about, it is along these lines alone, I submit, that heroism could possibly be
“banal” in the egalitarian sense described by Franco and Zimbardo (2006), and how
individuals in general are, as Zimbardo puts it, “heroes in waiting” (see Sommers,
2009).
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